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Abstract: In the recent literature on whether there would have been an 
incarnation if there had been no fall, Thomas Aquinas is often cited as 
arguing for a negative answer on the grounds that it is more fitting. Little 
attention, however, has been given to what fittingness amounts to for 
Thomas, or what relation this has to the primarily biblical reasons he gives 
for denying an incarnation without the fall. In this paper, I argue that 
fittingness derives primarily from what kinds of conclusions can be drawn 
from the biblical text—fitting conclusions are those that, though short of 
necessary truths, nevertheless ought to be preferred over all of the possible 
alternatives because they best cohere with the nature of the scriptural canon. 
The answer to whether an incarnation would have occurred, for Thomas, is 
an example of one such biblical conclusion. I then place Thomas’ arguments 
in conversation with contemporary advocates for an ‘Incarnation Anyway’ 
and show that their strategy of argumentation is actually accommodated by 
Thomas’ position, leaving it safe from criticism. 
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Much recent attention has been given to the question of the contingency of the 
incarnation upon the fall. 1  This has gone under the heading of ‘Incarnation 
Anyway’ (hereafter ‘IA’), where ‘incarnation’ specifies the eternal Word’s 
assuming a human nature in addition to his divine nature, and ‘anyway’ specifies 
the counterfactual conditions under which this would obtain, in this case 
independent from this (or any) fall into sin. A salutary and propaedeutic 
discussion to this, however, comes from scholastic debates in the 13th century, in 
                                                 
1 The text that has revived the discussion in contemporary dogmatics is (van Driel 2008). See also 
(van Driel 2017) and (Crisp 2016). 
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which Thomas Aquinas occupies a uniquely suggestive place in the development 
of the question.2 
 Theologians have helpfully noted that Thomas’ contribution lies in his 
subtle use of the concept of ‘fittingness.’3 Lying somewhere between necessity and 
unspecified possibility, Thomas’ use of the concept renders his position more 
complicated than a straightforward denial of an IA (pace many who are interested 
in reifying the Thomist/Scotist distinction4). Instead, it is a more nuanced balancing 
of what God is able to do and what he has chosen to do. Little to no attention is 
given, however, as to why Thomas goes with fittingness, and what relevance his 
appeal to the teaching of Scripture has to the modality of his answer. In point of 
fact, I shall argue, his views about an IA reflects his opinions about how Scripture 
relates to theological conclusions; that is, that some theological conclusion C is 
fitting is directly connected to the way that C relates to Scripture, either by 
proceeding from Scripture’s nature or is in accordance with Scripture’s purposes in 
bringing about the greatest goods in the lives of Christians. I shall show in the final 
section of this paper that this approach complicates the logic of contemporary 
arguments in favor of an IA. Thus, what at first appeared as a speculative question 
(in the most pejorative sense) actually puts on display a method by which 
theologians should seek to be biblical in their work, while further chipping away at 
the misrepresentation of Thomas as the “beginning of a trajectory that had reached 
a dead–end in the dry and defensive anti–modern theology of neo–scholasticism 
and the church politics that supported it” (Healy 2005, 2). 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 In this paper I will bracket the relevance of the broader historical development of the question, 
as my hopes are to draw out the particular benefits of Thomas’ approach for contemporary 
theology. The 13th century appears to have inherited its conceptual material from the felix culpa 
tradition dating back to the fourth century. It was Rupert of Deutz who first brought it to explicit 
theological consideration, and Robert Grosseteste and Alexander of Hales are significant in making 
the counterfactual question of whether God would have been incarnate even if humanity had not 
sinned common coin amongst scholastics. Thomas seems to have inherited the modal category of 
‘fittingness’ from his teacher, Albertus Magnus, whose Commentarii in Tertium Librum Sententiarum 
begins with inquiring “an conveniebat Deum incarnari?” (d. 1, q. 1, a. 1). For useful accounts of the 
development of the question in Medieval theology, see (Westcott 1892), (Adams 2006) and (Hunter 
2015). 
3  (Narcisse 1997) stands unsurpassed as the most thorough investigation of Thomas on 
fittingness. Narcisse is frequently cited as defining ‘fittingness’ as “a realized possibility” that 
carries with it implications for necessity (109)—but that to me just sounds like an actuality. 
4 See (Hunter 2015) for this debate, especially 174. 
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1. Thomas on the Contingency of the Incarnation Upon the Fall 
 
In this section I shall exposit Thomas’ view on whether God would have become 
incarnate if humanity had not sinned, which I take to be one way to arrive at an 
answer to the question of an IA.5 It has been noted that Thomas’ views on the 
matter remain consistent throughout his career, though there is some evidence of 
development. He treats it in three places—Scriptum super Sententiis (Script. Sent.) 
III, d. 1, q. 1, a. 3, Super Primam Epistolam ad Timotheum (ad Tim.) (1:15), lecture 4 
and Summa Theologiae (ST) III, q. 1, a. 3—all of which answer the counterfactual 
question negatively. This led many 20th century theologians to draw a line in 
theology on the matter of an IA – Thomists answer negatively, Scotists positively.6 
Thus Ilia Delio: Thomas Aquinas “maintains a strict correlation between the 
Incarnation, sin, and redemption” (2003, 23. Emphasis added.) Recent theologians 
have attempted to correct such strong claims of correspondence between human 
sin and the incarnation in Thomas’ thought, observing that if there were such a 
“strict correlation,” then Thomas’ affirmation would be incompatible with his 
other statements about an IA. 
For instance, in his most mature treatment of the question, Thomas affirms both 
that “with sin not existing, the incarnation would not have been” and that “even 
with sin not existing, it would have been possible for God to have become 
incarnate.” (ST III, q. 1, a. 3).7 On the one hand, he seems to say that if there had not 
been a fall, there could not have been an incarnation; on the other hand, he also 
seems to say that if there had not been a fall, there could have been an incarnation. 
But if the first claim is taken as a ‘strict correlation,’ then it is incompatible with the 
second claim, if for no other reason than the mere logical truth that “if not p then it 
is not possible that q” is incompatible with “if not p then possibly q.” Additionally, 
such a reading ignores the most prevalent modal concept in Thomas’ Christology, 
namely ‘fittingness’: “Fittingness largely defines Aquinas’ Christology and his use 
                                                 
5 Hunter (2015, 31) defines three ways in which medieval theologians arrived at a conclusion 
about IA: a hypothetical or counterfactual question, incipient in Rupert of Deutz and found in 
Thomas (“Whether, if humanity had not sinned, God would have become incarnate?”); a general 
question about the ratio incarnationis (“Whether and how can we determine divine reasons for 
divine operations ad extra?”); and a specific question (“Is the redemption from sin the primary 
reason for the incarnation?”). He also notes that it was with Bonaventure that the question shifted 
from its counterfactual form to a positive question about the reason for the incarnation. Hunter 
helpfully shows how any of these approaches entail some kind of conclusion about IA.  
6 See (Bauerschmidt 2005, 459) for substantiation of this development in 20th century Catholic 
theology, particularly from theological textbooks. 
7 All translations of Thomas Aquinas throughout this article are my own. 
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of other modal categories” (Barnes 2012, 670). As such, most interpreters have now 
come to see that drawing a sharp line between Scotists and Thomists ignores the 
nuances of both views. As Bauerschmidt says, this approach amounts to a “serious 
distortion” (2005, 467).  
So what is fittingness, and what relation does it have to Thomas’ considerations 
about an IA? Interpreters like Bauerschmidt, Barnes and Hunter have rightly noted 
that one of the key roles it plays in Thomas’ theology is to arrive at conclusions 
whose modality is somewhere between necessity and unspecified possibility. This 
much is evident to anyone who traces out Thomas’ views on the matter. Thomas’ 
first approach to the issue appears in his commentary on Peter Lombard’s 
Sentences, wherein he asserts that “in the canon of Scripture and in the words of the 
saints this is the only cause assigned to the incarnation, namely the redemption of 
humanity from the servitude of sin”. But this affirmation can only be said with 
probability: “therefore, they say this with probability, that if humanity had not 
sinned, the Son of God would not have become human”. The emphasis on 
probability is meant to take into account others who say that “since through the 
incarnation of the Son of God not only liberation from sin might be accomplished, 
but also the exaltation of human nature and the consummation of the whole 
universe, even if sin had not existed, because of these causes there would have 
been an incarnation.” This position, too, says Thomas, “is able to be upheld with 
probability” (Script. Sent. III, d. 1, q. 1, a. 3). Thus, when arriving at a theological 
conclusion to this question, the best to which one can aspire is a likely or probable 
answer. Citing the passage above, Bauerschmidt summarizes: “Thomas is clear 
that there is nothing external or internal that necessitates the Incarnation in the 
strict sense of logical necessity. Nothing in the divine nature, or in the nature of 
creation, compels God to enter into personal union with creatures. As an 
uncompelled act of divine love toward humanity and all creation, the Incarnation 
cannot be deduced a priori, but can only be revealed to us” (2005, 466–7). Thus, 
already as early as the Scriptum Super Sententiis, Thomas brings together the 
concepts of canonical consideration, modality and probability, thereby avoiding 
the incompatibility brought by an emphasis on strict correlation. 
Turning to Thomas’ commentary on 1 Timothy 1:15,8 we see similar themes. 
Thomas is persuaded that the ad quid of the incarnation is found in this text, 
namely “to save sinners,” and he immediately adduces corroboration from John 
3:17 and 12:47. It is in this context that Thomas returns to the familiar 
                                                 
8 “Fidelis sermo, et omni acceptione dignus: quod Christus Iesus venit in hunc mundum peccatores salvos 
facere, quorum primus ego sum,” in the Vulgate. 
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counterfactual question from the Sentences commentary: “But if no one had become 
a sinner, would the incarnation not have occurred?” (Ad Tim., 4). Thomas thinks 
that the evidence weighs toward the negative, given both the Scriptural teaching 
already mentioned and the words of the Fathers. The subsequent sentence, 
however, gives indication that the modal caution he displayed in the Scriptum 
super Sententiis is not abandoned:  
 
But this question is not of great weight, since God has ordained that which will 
come about according to the things that actually were to exist. And we are ignorant 
of what he would have ordained if he had not foreseen sin; nevertheless, the 
Authorities seem to state expressly that there would not have been an Incarnation 
if humanity had not sinned. I am more partially inclined to this (Ad Tim., 4). 
 
Thomas notes that God only ordains or orders events that are to obtain in the 
actual world—it is not possible that God will a world where Liverpool FC win the 
Premier League in 2019 and the world turn out to be one in which they do not win 
that year, for God’s will is not thwarted.9 Rather, God has knowledge of these 
counterfactual circumstances and the conditionals that populate them, even if he 
does not will them (i.e., ‘if Liverpool FC won the Premier League in 2019, then 
many Scousers would have rejoiced’).10 But do we have access to God’s knowledge 
of counterfactual states and conditionals? No, says Thomas, “we are ignorant of 
what he would have ordained if he had not foreseen sin”; we only know what he 
has revealed in Scripture, and Scripture only contains actual events. Crisp puts it 
well: “The biblical material that speaks of Christ’s work in the world is concerned 
only to explain why Christ actually came into the world” (2016, 230). Of course, 
Scripture can reveal bits and pieces of God’s counterfactual knowledge to us, but 
this is where Thomas’ weighing of the biblical material is important—we just don’t 
seem to have this kind of information revealed to us. It is not impossible; it just did not 
happen. God’s will is only known through revelation, and God only wills those 
things that become actual; therefore, all revelation is actual, and does not speak to 
counterfactual instances of ways God could have willed. So, concludes Thomas, 
when we weigh what has been revealed, we ought to lean toward denying an IA. 
                                                 
9 Cf. ST I, q. 19, a. 6. Of course, God is able to will differently; actual events simply show that he 
did not. 
10 This will have weighty implications for fittingness, as I shall argue, but suffice it to say here 
that the fittingness of a given view will turn on how strictly it adheres to the actual events of 
revelation. 
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So, we see something far more circumspect than a straightforward denial of an 
IA in the commentary on 1 Timothy. Rather, Thomas is carefully weighing the 
biblical material and pairing it with modal concerns. He does not want to restrict 
God’s free action by claiming too much for human knowledge and wants to 
remain firmly within the auspices of Scripture. So once again, biblical and modal 
concerns come together with a respect for God’s freedom, with the result that an 
answer to the counterfactual question of whether God would have become 
incarnate had there been no sin is something far less than certain or necessary—we 
“incline toward” it. 
Finally, we come to Thomas’ mature treatment of the matter in the Summa 
Theologiae. The ST is helpful for discerning Thomas’ views on this topic, for it 
brings together the concepts already in play in his earlier work, like fittingness,11 
God’s will and the importance of staying within the bounds of revelation. This 
much is clear from the outset, for he begins his discussion with a consideration 
“concerning the fittingness of the incarnation itself” (ST III, a. 1, prologue). 
Between articles one and two, Thomas gives us a well–rounded definition of what 
makes something fitting. First, “to each thing, something is fitting which belongs to 
it by reason of its own nature” (ST III, q. 1, a. 1). A commonplace example of this, 
postulates Thomas, is that reason is fitting for a human being, since rationality 
follows from the nature of a human being. But the nature of God is goodness, and 
the essence of goodness is communication to others. Transitively, then, it is fitting 
for God to communicate himself to creatures, and this is done maximally by the 
incarnation. Thus, something is fitting with respect some being just in case it 
proceeds from or is possessed by that being’s nature, and the nature in question 
when it comes to the fittingness of the incarnation is the divine nature.12  
In article two, Thomas considers another question, namely whether it was 
necessary for salvation that the incarnation should occur. There are two ways 
“something is said to be necessary for some end” (ST III, q. 1, a. 2). According to 
the first, something is necessary when “without it something is not able to come 
about.” The incarnation was not necessary for salvation in this way—there are 
                                                 
11 “Convenientia” is mentioned in the second article of the same question in the Commentary on 
the Sentences, though Thomas does not make the connection there with the claims to probabiliter in 
the third article. By the time of the ST that connection is made. 
12 Note that here it is not human nature—there is nothing about the condition of human nature 
(“conditionem suae naturae”) that renders it fitting to be united to God. It is above the dignity of 
human nature (“supra dignitatem”). Thus, it is God’s goodness that graciously brings about the 
union of humanity and divinity (ST III, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2). I leave to the side the implications this may 
have for nature/grace debates. 
ON THOMAS AQUINAS’S REJECTION OF AN ‘INCARNATION ANYWAY’ 
 
 
150 
 
“many other ways” by which God could have saved. According to the second, 
something is necessary when that thing is the “better” and “more fitting” means of 
obtaining the end. Thomas here gives the famous example of the necessity of a 
horse for a journey; in the first kind of the necessity, I can arrive at my destination 
by many other means (walking, crawling, crab–walking), but riding a horse is the 
best and most fitting way to arrive, and the incarnation is necessary in this second 
kind of necessity. But what counts toward “better” and “more fitting”? “The 
promotion of humanity in the good” and “the withdrawal from evil” (ST III, q. 1, a. 
2).13 Thomas notes five upshots to each aspect, bolstering heavy evidence for why 
the incarnation is necessary in virtue of its fittingness. If something can bring 
together (literally, “con–venire”) the greatest number of goods and avoid the 
greatest number of evils in accomplishing some end, then it is fitting and ipso facto 
the necessary way to obtain that end. 
So, by definition, x is fitting if (a) it proceeds from or belongs to y by reason of 
y’s nature and/or (b) is the means to achieving some end that brings together the 
most goods and avoids the greatest evils.14 Thus we come to ST III, q. 1, a. 3, where 
Thomas answers that “it is more fitting that the work of the incarnation be said to 
be ordained from God for the remedy of sin, so that, sin not existing, there would 
not have been an incarnation.” Note that we have a return to the emphasis on the 
ordaining of God from 1 Timothy 1:15, which is one of two texts Thomas cites in 
the sed contra. These matters, argues Thomas, “arise only from the will of God, 
[being] above the entirety of the ken of a creature,” and as such “they are not able 
to be known by us except insofar as it has been delivered in Sacred Scripture, 
through which the divine will is known.” Here we must recall not only his 
comments on 1 Tim. 1:15 but also the nature of sacred doctrine, the subject matter 
of the ST—those things that are of God or pertain to God.15 These things “were 
necessary for human salvation” even though they constitute “an end which 
exceeds the comprehension of reason” (ST I, q. 1, a. 1). Thus, among the things that 
exceed the grasp of human reason and yet constitute an aspect of sacred doctrine is 
the matter of an IA. Consequently, our only possible answer to the question must 
                                                 
13 Interestingly, Thomas here elides convenientia and necessitas with utile, further illustrating how 
the most fitting route is the one that gets the job done the best! 
14 My guess is that (a) and (b) are both independently necessary and sufficient conditions for 
fittingness, given Thomas’ examples. Rationality is fitting with respect to a human being in the first 
kind of way, while riding a horse to a destination is fitting in the second kind of way, while neither 
can be construed according to the alternative way. Rationality is not a means to any end; a horse is 
not part of the nature of traveling. 
15 Cf. ST I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1. 
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come from revelation, which makes known to us those things about our end that 
escape our reason. 
But these considerations would be true of any answer to the question as to 
whether God would have been incarnate if humanity had not sinned. It is not as if 
Thomas goes with the negative answer because it is the only one that depends on 
revealed truth as opposed to relying on human reason. Even worse, it hard to see 
how a reading of ST III.1.3 which merely states, “Thomas proffers a fitting answer 
because he relies on divinely–willed revelation,” meets either of the two conditions 
for fittingness specified above. This is where contemporary readers of Thomas 
cease to be of help. For instance, Bauerschmidt tells us that “Thomas in fact thinks 
that unaided reason not only cannot grasp what God is, neither can it deduce a 
priori what God wills to do” and that “he wishes to guard the incomprehensibility 
of God from those who are sure they can deduce what God’s nature must entail in 
a given possible order of things” (2005, 465, 467); but it is hard to see how these 
affirmations should lead us to prefer one answer to the IA question over another. If 
the only criteria we have for discerning fittingness are the preservation of God’s 
incomprehensibility and biblical dependence, how are we to discern whether we 
should affirm or deny an IA if they both meet the criteria? Or again, consider 
Hunter, who rightly notes that “the authority of Scripture and the holy expositors 
of Scripture, Aquinas submits, are the only means of access we have to the motive 
of the incarnation” (2015, 178). But once we have access to this motive, how are we 
to know where to go? Presumably it is far from self–evident what Scripture will say 
concerning an IA. Contemporary readers, it seems, rightly note the modal 
qualifications in Thomas’ view without explaining how he arrives at those 
qualifications from Scripture.  
What is needed is an account as to how a particular answer regarding an IA can 
be said to be fitting or unfitting with respect to the biblical text. Perhaps it can be said 
that denying an IA better preserves God’s freedom and transcendence by means of 
their greater adherence to Scripture, but that only pushes the question one step 
further: what constitutes greater adherence? Thomas’ reason that God would not 
have become incarnate if there had been no fall, from the Scriptum super Sententiis 
to the Summa Theologiae, is that this is the most fitting conclusion with respect to 
the Bible. But this question requires an account as to how theological conclusions 
relate to Scripture more broadly, and in what way that relation can be called fitting. 
It is the task of the second section of this paper to give such an account. 
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2. From Scripture to Theology Through Fittingness 
 
How ought a theologian move from Scripture to theology? That is, how does the 
text of Scripture relate to a dogmatic conclusion such that the conclusion is rightly 
called “biblical”? As I suggested, fittingness operates as one such bridge for 
Thomas—a theological conclusion is biblical if it is fitting with respect to the 
biblical text. Eugene Rogers has thus observed that Thomas’ exegesis falls under 
“the rubric conveniens ratio, a fitting explication or suitable reason” (2013, 104). He 
cites as evidence one of Thomas’ lengthiest exegetical sections in the ST, where he 
inquires whether there can be “a fitting cause for the sacraments of the Old Law” 
(ST I–II, q. 102, a. 5, ad 1). But what makes one theological conclusion a more fitting 
correspondence to Scripture than another? 
A distinction that has been proffered recently will go some way to elucidating 
this matter. It comes from David Kelsey, who distinguishes between “direct” and 
“indirect” biblical authorizations. The former is “a direct quotation in the proper 
form… In such a case scripture would authorize a conclusion, i.e., authorize it 
without the mediation of any other authority, in response to the challenge to the 
conclusion. How did you get to that conclusion from this data?” (1999, 140). In the 
case of a direct authorization, mere quotation serves as sufficient warrant for 
authorizing a theological conclusion. “Is God love or hatred?” someone may ask. 
“Whoever does not love does not know God, for God is love”—and so we 
conclude that God is indeed love, not hatred (1 John 4:8). The banality of such an 
example betrays the infrequency of such direct authorizations. Far more often, 
argues Kelsey, theologians seek indirect authorizations for their conclusions, 
where Scripture is first construed as a certain kind of pattern and a decision is then 
made about what makes that pattern authoritative for theological conclusions. In 
that case, a conclusion is authorized if it conforms to the pattern in question: “what 
theologians appeal to… is some type of pattern in biblical texts… Judgments about 
them are corrigible by attending to these particularities” (1999, 193). Thus, 
Scripture’s text is construed as a pattern admitting of right or wrong conformity, 
and that pattern serves as the authority for theological conclusions. 
It seems to me that if we are going to begin to understand Thomas’ recourse to 
fittingness with regard to the IA question, we must place it among conclusions 
seeking indirect authorization; that is, claiming that one conclusion is more fitting 
than another one is a claim validated by indirect authorization. We have already 
seen that fittingness is a concept whose modality is weaker than necessity. So it is 
with theological conclusions from fittingness: “Arguments from convenientia befit 
the realm of contingency rather than necessity” (Rogers 2013, 104). Direct 
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authorizations function in deductive ways, where the conclusions follow necessarily 
from their premises. Kelsey notes that their internal logic is something like this: 
Scripture asserts x; if Scripture asserts x, then x is true; therefore, x is true.16 If x is 
the conclusion of the theologian, then she has not arrived at a contingent conclusion 
through an inductive argument, such as an inference to the best explanation. 
Rather, her conclusion will necessarily follow from her premises. But from what 
we’ve seen, this is miles from the kind of conclusion at which Thomas arrives 
when considering the question of an IA. He arrives at a conclusion that probably 
follows from the premises (probabiliter). So, it must be a conclusion that receives 
indirect authorization. 
But indirect authorization designates a variety of ways a theologian can 
approach her task. So what kind of indirect authorization is Thomas’ ‘fittingness’? 
For that, we must understand Thomas’ ontology of Scripture so as to understand 
his construal of the pattern of the text. Scripture has a final cause, an end for which 
it is the means that obtains the greatest amount of goods and avoids the greatest 
amount of evils: “Therefore, so that the salvation for humans might be provided 
both fittingly and certainly, it was necessary that the things concerning divinity 
might be taught through divine revelation” (ST I, q. 1, a. 1). Notice, however, that 
this just is Thomas’ second definition of fittingness from ST III, q. 1, a. 2, wherein 
the means that achieves the greatest goods and avoids the greatest evils is the most 
fitting and therefore the necessary means of obtaining that end. In this case, the 
end is God and the means to obtaining that end is divine revelation. This brings 
about human salvation as a good, and avoids damnation as an evil, ensuring 
divine revelation as a fitting means to bring us to God!  
But this does not yet get us to being able to tell which conclusions drawn from 
Scripture are thereby fitting with it, and for that we must discern how conclusions 
are fitting in the other way, designated by ST III, q. 1, a. 1. We must look for a way 
that a theological conclusion belongs to or follows from the teaching of Scripture 
by reason of that teaching’s nature. Here Thomas’ recognition of the use of 
metaphors in Scripture is important. When inquiring whether Holy Scripture 
should use metaphors, Thomas answers:  
 
It is fitting for Sacred Scripture to transmit divine and spiritual truth under the 
similitude of material things. For God provides for all things according to what 
belongs to their nature. Now it is natural to humanity that it arrives at intelligible 
things by means of sensible things, since all of our knowledge has its beginning 
                                                 
16 I’ve simplified (Kelsey 1999, 141). 
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from sense. Hence, spiritual things are fittingly transmitted to us in Sacred 
Scripture under the metaphors of the body (ST I, q. 1, a. 9; cf. ad 1 and 3). 
 
Thus, God’s revelation to human beings in Scripture fittingly uses metaphors on 
account of its nature—as a revelation to human beings, it belongs to Scripture’s 
nature to use metaphors. This metaphorical communication then goes on to 
ground the fourfold sense of Scripture, with the basis on the historical sense.17 The 
teaching to which our conclusions consequently conform takes into account this 
aspect of Scripture’s narrative. 
Let us then bring together the various threads under consideration so as to 
arrive at Thomas’ view of indirect authorization by means of fittingness. Kevin 
Vanhoozer has recently written, “To think biblically is… indwelling Scripture as a 
unified narrative with rich patterns (e.g. judgment and mercy) and interwoven 
images (e.g. sacrificial lambs) that come into greater focus as they are seen to center 
on Jesus Christ” and that “the supreme criterion for knowledge, goodness, beauty, and 
truth is Christo–dramatic fittingness” (2015, 156; 2005, 256).18 My hope is to show that 
this, or something close to it, is Thomas’ view, namely, that the pattern of authority 
is the narrative of the canon told with reference to its metaphorical sense as it 
points to Christ, and that theological conclusions are biblical if fitting with this 
construal. Vanhoozer makes mention of a “unified narrative”—Thomas, too, 
operates with a construal of Scripture as a coherent canonical narrative stretching 
from Genesis to Revelation. Recall that as early as the Sentences commentary 
Thomas was concerned to show that the question concerning IA is “only able to be 
known by the one who was born and poured out, for he has willed it.” And the 
way this will can be known is only “in the canon of Scripture” (Script. Sent. III., d. 
1, q. 1, a. 3). Or again, in both the Super Primam Epistolam ad Timotheum and the ST, 
Thomas makes recourse to the entire breadth of canonical witness to discern the 
fittingness of the denial of IA: “nevertheless, the Authorities seem to state 
expressly,” “since everywhere in Sacred Scripture…” (ad Tim., 4; ST III, q. 1, a.3). In 
this way, Thomas displays what Vanhoozer has called “canonical sense.”19 
Thus far we have seen that Thomas thinks that metaphors are a fitting way for 
God to communicate to us in Scripture and that this is displayed throughout the 
                                                 
17 Cf. ST I, a. 1, q. 10. 
18 One need not get distracted by Vanhoozer’s “drama” language – as I hope to show, what he 
means by it is not something all that different from Thomas’ attention to canonical breadth. 
19  For further evidence of Thomas’ canonical sensibilities see ad Tim., chpt. 6, lectio 1, 
commenting on 1 Tim. 6:3. See also ST II–II, q. 1, a. 9 ad 1. I owe these references to (Marshall 1989, 
375 n. 47), whose article is a terrific help on Thomas’ views about theological method and Scripture. 
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canon. One more element remains for a full picture of Thomas’ construal of the 
authoritative pattern of Scripture, namely the centrality of Christ to the canon. 
Thus he says in response to the diversity of the objects of hope throughout the 
canon: 
 
The same things were always being hoped by all. Nevertheless, since humanity 
had not arrived at this hope except through Christ, to the measure that they were 
removed from Christ according to time, consequently to that measure [they were] 
distant from their hopes, as the apostle has said in Heb. 11[:13], “All these have 
died according to faith having not received the promises, but [were] recipients of 
them from afar.” Now the measure to which something seems more far off is the 
measure to which that thing seems less distinct. And therefore those who 
perceived the good hope were the ones close to the advent of Christ (ST II–II, a. 1, 
q. 7, ad 1). 
 
Thomas thinks that within the canon specificity regarding Christian hope is 
diverse—the measure of specificity accorded to the hope is directly correlated to 
the proximity the hoper has to the coming of Christ, the consummation of all hope. 
So, the canonical display of Scripture is not a flat topography; rather, there is a 
perspicuous incline from Genesis onwards to the coming of Christ, the apogee of 
the canonical story. 
In sum, we might state Thomas’ construal of Scripture for the authorization of 
biblical texts as follows: the entirety of the canon is a story whose metaphorical elements 
point to and receive greater clarity as they approach the advent of Christ, the center of the 
narrative.20 The remainder of the task is to show how fittingness is the means by 
which a theological conclusion conforms to that pattern. Recall the two ways that 
something can be called fitting: x is fitting if (a) it proceeds from or belongs to y by 
reason of y’s nature and/or (b) is the means to achieving some end that brings 
about the most goods and avoids the greatest evils. In the first sense, the relevant x 
is a theologian’s conclusion, and the relevant y is Thomas’ construal of the canon as 
a narrative centered on Christ. Thus, a theological conclusion is fitting in the first 
sense just in case that conclusion proceeds from or belongs to Thomas’ construal of 
Scripture by reason of that teaching’s nature. This requires careful attention to just 
                                                 
20 My emphasis on metaphor is not intended to denigrate Thomas’ adherence to the historical 
sense; I do not mention the historical sense simply because any appeal to a metaphor will 
necessarily make recourse to the historical sense. Additionally, this summary has interesting 
implications for those theologians who claim Thomas has a “narrative Christology,” noting how 
questions 27–59 of the tertia pars uniquely and closely adhere to the moments of Christ’s life. The 
work the canonical narrative performs in Thomas’ theology is fecund but frequently overlooked. 
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what the nature of the canon is, calling for intense and acute sensitivity to the 
shape and contours of the canon. 
This is what Thomas thinks he is offering when he argues that God would not 
have become incarnate had humanity not sinned—it is the sum total of the witness 
of Scripture with particular emphasis on Christ. When we read Scripture 
canonically, we see the revealed will of God, the pinpoint of which is the 
incarnation, life, death, descent, resurrection, ascension and session of the God–
Man. This is the center of the canon, not some other counterfactual instance of the 
incarnation. This is the Christ that we have been given, not some other; he is the 
center of the canonical story, not some other. Recall that the canon reveals the 
actual will of God, not his counterfactual knowledge. Thus the Christ we find is the 
actual Christ divinely willed to be incarnate, not a counterfactually possible one. 
This is brought out with further clarity in later arguments for denying an IA in the 
tradition:  
 
But since all Scripture proclaims that to become our Redeemer he was clothed with 
flesh, it is too presumptuous to imagine another reason or another end… For he 
who is tickled with desire to know something more, not content with God’s 
unchangeable ordinance, also shows that he is not even content with this very 
Christ, who was given to us as the price of our redemption (Calvin 1960, II.12.4–5, 
467, 469).21  
 
Denying an IA is more fitting because it better corresponds to the nature of the 
narrative of the canon and its actual center, as Thomas’ canonically–sensitive 
recourse to “everywhere” subtly indicates. 
With respect to the second sense of fittingness, denying an IA is supposed to 
bring about the greatest number of goods and avoid the greatest number of evils. 
Here we can turn to ST III, q. 1, a. 2, which, after defining the kind of necessity that 
follows from fittingness, specifies the kinds of results the incarnation fittingly 
brings together. Of the ten results of the incarnation, some are contingent upon 
and responsive to the fall, but some are not. For instance, Thomas’ fifth end for the 
furtherance of good is that the incarnation brings about “the full participation in 
divinity, which is truly the beatitude of humanity, and the end of human life. And 
this was conferred to us through the humanity of Christ.” This is an end that 
obtains quite apart from our fall into sin, thereby requiring an incarnation, since it 
only happens through the humanity of Christ. This is noticeably different than the 
                                                 
21 It is remarkable to note the degree to which John Calvin’s position mirrors Thomas’ in its 
logic. In this, and many other places, Calvin clearly stands as an inheritor of Thomas’ view. 
FELLIPE DO VALE 
157 
 
ends the Passion brings about, found in ST III, q. 46, a. 3, all of which are 
contingent upon the fall. All five ends are for “salvation,” or “justifying grace,” or 
“refraining from sin,” or to “overthrow the devil.” What this shows is that 
Thomas’ fittingness approach to the IA is able to accommodate the reasons given 
by proponents of an IA while still denying that there would have been an 
incarnation without sin (more on this below). What we see here is that if denying 
an IA is going to merit the title “fitting” in the second way, it will have sufficient 
breadth to bring together all of the varieties of ends the incarnation accomplishes. 
The more ends a view about the incarnation brings together, the greater the 
fittingness, giving us ample reason to favor some theological conclusion over 
another as more fitting. 
What I hope has been shown is that Thomas’ approach to the IA question is 
something far more nuanced than fittingness as a mere modal concept. Rather, it is 
a modal concept springing forth from his persuasions about the nature of the canon and 
theological interpretation. Fittingness is a mechanism for adjudicating moves from 
Scripture to theological conclusions, a mechanism that specifies what the 
conditions are for theological conclusions that pass muster as biblical. In short, it is 
Thomas’ way of authorizing his claims indirectly. 
 
3. Thomas Among Contemporary ‘IA’ Theologians 
 
The resurgence amongst theologians interested in an IA has seemed to follow a 
consistent pattern of argumentation.22 The consistent pattern goes something like 
this: first, identify an end accomplished by the incarnation other than salvation 
from sin; second, show how this end does not require the fall to remain desirable 
as an end; third, conclude that since this is a desirable end, God would nonetheless 
have brought it about through an incarnation even if there had been no fall, 
making it an end logically prior to the fall.23 In other words, if we can specify an 
                                                 
22 Edwin Chr. van Driel, who is perhaps the best–known proponent of this resurgence, has even 
appealed to considerations of fittingness in this logic. See (van Driel 2015, 362). 
23  For this reason, van Driel refers to his view as “supralapsarian Christology,” not to be 
confused with debates in Reformed theology regarding the logical ordering of the decrees of God. 
These two discussions may implicate one another, but van Driel is clear that “it is more helpful to 
keep both conversations separate, as one can be a supralapsarian with regard to one doctrine, while 
being an infralapsarian with regard to the other” (2017, 276 n. 7). To avoid confusion, I will not 
adopt van Driel’s nomenclature, but will nonetheless cite him on his own terms. The reader should 
not think that he is referring to another debate than the one at hand throughout this paper. 
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end to the incarnation other than salvation from sin, we have identified a reason to 
affirm an IA.24 
In what remains, I will consider two of the most prominent arguments for an IA, 
both of which follow the logic illustrated above. Then I will show that they do not 
pose a challenge to Thomas’ method; if Thomas is correct, it does not follow that if 
the incarnation has other ends besides salvation from sin that then there would 
have been an IA. Rather, it is part of the fittingness of the incarnation that it has 
other ends, and part of the fittingness of denying an IA is that it accomplishes as 
many goods as possible, including ends for which affirming an IA is intended to 
account. In other words, Thomas’ appeal to fittingness shows that proponents of 
an IA have not yet established their conclusion—merely showing that other ends 
obtain apart from a fall is compatible (and fitting) with denying an IA, so if they 
are to be persuasive as arguments for an IA, they not only need to identify these 
ends, but must also show why a denier of IA cannot happily affirm these ends 
too.25 To illustrate: Edwin van Driel argues, “if the incarnation inaugurates the 
eschatological life, in all the glory of Easter morning, the gift of the incarnation 
cannot be fully explained as a divine emergency measure triggered by human sin” 
(2008, 148). Thomas Aquinas, however, thinks it is possible to affirm the 
antecedent without concluding that our options for the consequent are either ‘then 
affirm an IA’ or ‘then the incarnation is only triggered by human sin.’ Rather, his 
fittingness approach accommodates all of the glories of Easter morning without 
affirming an IA. 
Consider, first, van Driel’s argument from ‘eschatological superabundance.’ He 
argues: 
 
The eschaton is not the restoration of the proton. In the eschaton there is an 
abundance, a richness in intimacy with God and in human transformation that the 
proton did not know. In Christ we gain more than we lost in Adam. However, the 
argument goes, such gain cannot be contingent upon sin…therefore, the richness of 
                                                 
24  Van Driel makes a further negative argument, namely that denying an IA makes the 
incarnation a ‘Plan B,’ which he makes against New Testament scholars N.T. Wright and J. Louis 
Martyn: “The very thing Christ does could have been accomplished by another agent – Israel; in 
fact, it should have been accomplished by Israel, and it would have been done if Israel had not fallen 
into disobedience. But this means that, in the context of salvation, Jesus is really plan B…It is 
Martyn’s understanding of Christ’s coming as an apocalyptic invasion into this world that makes 
him resist a praeparatio evangelica, but it is also that very notion that makes him conceive of Christ’s 
coming as a plan B” (2014, 232, 235). 
25 Of course, someone who denies an IA then incurs the additional burden of accounting for how 
those other goods would have been brought about had the incarnation not occurred. 
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the eschaton has to be understood in supralapsarian terms: it is not contingent 
upon sin. And since Christ is the embodiment of the abundance of the 
eschatological life, neither is the incarnation contingent upon sin (2008, 150–1). 
 
The final state of all creation has been ubiquitously held to be better than the first 
state, rightly observes van Driel. The improvement is due to at least two changes. 
The first regards human transformation: whereas we were created with the ability 
to sin, our final state will be one where we are unable to sin, surely an 
improvement. The second regards divine intimacy: “human beings come to see 
God as they never had before: face to face,” a gesture towards the supremacy of 
the beatific vision in much Western theology (2008, 151). 
Van Driel further argues that these two improvements “are intimately bound up 
with his [Christ’s] person: they are modeled after, brought about by, and directed 
at him…The theological question pressed by the supralapsarian therefore is this: if 
the superabundance of the eschaton is thus so intimately bound up with the 
person of Christ, can Christ be contingent upon sin? Would this not make the 
eschaton itself contingent upon sin?” (2008, 152).26 In other words, the things that 
make the eschaton so superabundant seem to depend on the incarnation: “But our 
citizenship is in heaven, and from it we await a Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ, who 
will transform our lowly body to be like his glorious body, by the power that 
enables him even to subject all things to himself” (Phil. 3:20–21). The promise 
spoken of here seems to comprise all of the eschatological promises of heaven, 
which appear to depend on our being transformed into the likeness of Christ’s 
glorious body, something he would not have without an incarnation. Thus, the 
superabundancy of the eschaton requires that the Son assume a human nature, and 
since this superabundancy is something that would have obtained whether or not 
there would have been a fall, we can affirm an IA. 
Van Driel correctly indicates that Thomas shares his views about the 
superabundance of the eschaton as “the telos of human history,” as he holds that 
the ultimate happiness of the beatific vision was not yet given to Adam (2008, 
153).27 So, on his view, Thomas should hold to an IA. But is that correct? Thomas, 
fully aware of the eschatological purposes of the incarnation, does not think so. He 
notes that one of the purposes of the incarnation is the strengthening of our hope.28 
                                                 
26 The language here is unfortunately misleading. Van Driel, when using the term ‘person of 
Christ,’ does not seem to be speaking of the personal agent of the hypostatic union, namely the 
second Person of the Trinity, the Logos. Instead, he is referring to the incarnate Christ. 
27 Cf. ST I, q. 94, a. 1. 
28 Cf. ST III, q. 1, a. 2. 
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The presence of such an end does not stand outside of the view that the incarnation 
is most likely contingent upon sin, for the incarnation’s contingency upon sin does 
not entail that it is restricted to being a cure for sin, at least not on Thomas’ account of 
fittingness. Recall that on the second definition of fittingness something is fitting if 
it accomplishes the greatest number of goods and avoids the greatest number of 
evils—the actual incarnation of Christ does this by accomplishing goods 
independent of salvation from sin. In other words, the fitting route can 
accommodate more goods than the ones necessary. What’s more, that an 
incarnation contingent upon human sin can still do this bolsters our reasons for 
denying an IA, since it can still bring together the desiderata of other ends and 
purposes. So in the end, van Driel identifies an end to the incarnation with which 
Thomas agrees, but which finds a happy home in his fittingness account of the 
denial of an IA. 
Secondly, consider Oliver Crisp’s recent argument for an IA which he calls the 
“christological union account,” since the end he is specifying that is not contingent 
upon human sin is union with Christ. He notes that “it is not possible for sinless 
human creatures to take the initiative and unite themselves to God independent of 
an act of divine condescension and accommodation such as that envisaged in the 
incarnation. Even sinless human beings are not capable of this feat of metaphysical 
bootstrapping!” (2016, 218–9). Since the chasm that separates human beings from 
God involves a metaphysical size–gap, God “must take the initiative and unite 
himself with one of these creaturely natures, assuming it, and thereby generating 
an interface between divinity and humanity so that human beings may have a 
conduit by means of which they may be united to God” (2016, 219). He gives an 
appropriately 21st–century illustration: the incarnation is like the wi–fi hub router 
one acquires to connect one’s devices to the Internet. The router requires at least 
two components—the parts that make it possible for individual items (laptops, 
iPhones, etc.) to connect to it, and the parts that make it able to connect to the 
Internet. Much in the same way, the incarnation serves as our ‘wireless hub’: “only 
if the interface between humanity and God is fully divine and fully human, having 
the relevant component parts that belong to each of these entities, will it be 
possible to generate the spiritual ‘hub’ by means of which human beings can be 
united to God, in order to participate in his divine life” (2016, 220). Thus, one of the 
ends the incarnation accomplishes is to provide the means for our union with God 
that bridges our metaphysical size–gap; since God has willed that we be united to 
him whether or not the fall occurred, it follows that the incarnation would have 
occurred ‘anyway.’ 
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Crisp not only claims that his view best accommodates texts like Colossians 1, 
Ephesians 5 and 2 Peter 1:4, but also that “a unitive view of God’s end in creation 
can be found…in the work of St Thomas Aquinas” (2016, 232). Borrowing from 
Brooke Westcott 29  and citing Thomas’ statement in ST III, q. 1, a. 1 that the 
fittingness of the incarnation comes from its purposes in divine goodness 
communicating itself, Crisp rightly observes that this end is “independent of 
questions of a fall from grace” (2016, 232). What’s more, Thomas himself shares an 
emphasis on union with God, a key feature of his ecclesiology and sacramental 
theology.30 But is such a unitive end sufficient for an IA? It seems that Crisp’s 
argument, like van Driel’s, is liable to the same misunderstanding. Fittingness 
acknowledges unitive ends for the incarnation and such ends actually provide 
warrant for denying an IA in just the same way.  
Of course, Thomas’ view can only accommodate van Driel’s and Crisp’s 
arguments if they share his assumption that we cannot know which counterfactual 
events obtain according to God’s will unless God reveals them, as argued in his 
commentary on 1 Tim. 1:15.31 Thus, specifying alternate ends to the incarnation 
does not entail an IA, but rather indicates the breadth of the actual incarnation. It 
could not constitute an end obtaining in a counterfactual circumstance, since 
Thomas thinks no such things have been revealed. All things that have been 
revealed are revelations of the divine will, which is always actualized, and 
counterfactuals are by definition not actual. If we share his views about that, then 
Thomas has shown that contemporary arguments for an IA do not obtain their 
conclusion. Yet, this may be too strong an assumption to share, revealing an 
Achilles’ heel to Thomas’ view; perhaps we do think that revelation speaks to 
                                                 
29  See (Westcott 1892, 300), where he states that Thomas’ arguments regarding the 
communication of goodness in ST III, a. 1, q. 1 is “evidently wholly independent of the 
consequences of the Fall.” He, too, follows the logic outlined above. 
30 See ST III, q. 48, a. 1; q. 48, a. 2 ad 1; q. 48, a.6 ad 2; III, q. 49, a. 1 and ad 4; q. 49, a. 3 ad 1–3; q. 
49, a. 4; and q. 49, a. 5. 
31 Crisp does not share this assumption, as suggested in (2016, 230). It is harder to see where van 
Driel stands with it. He wants to distinguish himself from counterfactual questions regarding IA 
and deal with “the story as we have it”: “I do not ask what would have happened if we had not 
sinned; I ask about the incarnation as it happened, about the Christ as we have him; and my point is 
that the incarnation as it happened gives us so much, and is so rich in terms of divine friendship 
and intimacy that it cannot be explained as only a divine countermeasure against sin. Granted: the 
biblical narrative does not carry supralapsarianism on its sleeves, and so the case has to be made in 
terms of inferences and arguments. But this is not different from, let us say, the notion of a divine 
Trinity or the doctrine of the two natures of Christ. In that sense, supralapsarian Christology is thus 
in good company” (2015, 367). Statements like these make me think that he shares Thomas’ 
assumption (and the first part could actually come from the mouth of Thomas himself!). 
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counterfactual circumstances and their conditionals. Even if that is the case, 
Scripture would have to speak directly to this particular counterfactual state of 
affairs, namely, that there would have been an incarnation had there been no sin. 
But neither Crisp nor van Driel think this is available to us. All the same, Thomas 
thinks that Scripture is the narrative of salvation that actually obtains, not one that 
speaks to what will not obtain in the actual world. As such, it does not speak to 
counterfactual worlds and their conditionals. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have tried to show three things. First, while contemporary 
interpreters of Thomas on IA rightly observe his modal qualifications, but they fall 
short in noting why he holds to such modal qualifications and how they arise from 
his interpretation of Scripture. Second, Thomas moves from Scripture to theology 
by means of fittingness, and conclusions from Scripture are biblical just in case 
they are fitting with the canonical narrative, and these conclusions have a certain 
modal status due to their relation to Scripture. Lastly, if we place Thomas’ 
considerations alongside contemporary arguments for IA, he is able to 
accommodate their arguments and still deny an IA. This works if we share his 
assumptions about Scripture and what it teaches (or does not teach) about 
counterfactuals. In the end, Thomas’ denial of an IA is deeply biblical, and it 
reveals his views about just what counts as such. 
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